Our key findings are a 1% increase in trade costs will result in a fall of 0.73% in goods exports value overall, a value considerably lower in magnitude than has been found previously but nonetheless much more in line with recent international research. A Soft-Brexit where the UK remains within the EU Customs Union will have no effect on the value of trade. Under a Hard Brexit where the UK leaves the Single Market and Customs Union and applies WTO tariffs to Irish goods exports, the value of goods exports to the existing EU-28 will fall by 1.4% while the overall value of goods exports will fall by €0.8bn on average. This overall fall in value will be borne mainly in the traditional sectors of agriculture, food and beverages, and textiles, where the hit will be between 9 to 12% in value terms. In the long term where Irish goods that had been sent to the UK are sent to EU countries instead and sold at EU country market prices, the effect of Brexit will result in a fall of €9.2bn in total export value. Many Irish export firms are unlikely to be able to sustain the associated fall in export sale values of between 50 and 95% and will likely cease trading. In national income terms we also estimate that GNI* will fall by up to 0.4% under WTO tariffs against the current baseline and by over 5%, if over the longer term Irish goods are diverted to other EU countries instead of the UK.
INTRODUCTION
In Ireland, our international trade policy strives to ensure our economic prosperity and well-being. Our trade policy is operationalised primarily through our membership of the EU. Crucially, for a small open economy like Ireland the advancement of trade under an international rules-based system is essential to sustaining economic growth and national income. However, this system is experiencing considerable change, whether it be the increasing economic and political influence of China, the impact of global financial crisis, the efforts by large economies to shape the global agenda in the G8 and G20, the rise of populism and its emphasis on trade protectionism and not least, for Ireland at any rate, Brexit, which is the focus of this paper. As a small state with limited resources and influence Ireland must navigate its way through these changes in the international trade regime. Crucial to this is a broad feel for trade relationships and a mature analysis of the evidence based on sound principles. An almost ubiquitous and valuable quantitative methodology available to those seeking to understand international trade relationships is the Gravity Model. The key features of the Gravity Model are that it assumes trade between two countries is a function of their economic masses and inversely of their distance apart -the resemblance to Newton's Law of Gravity is clear and hence the name. In this paper we use the Gravity Model as a platform to study the impact of Brexit on the value of Irish merchandise goods exports.
Furthermore, we use this insight to consider how Ireland might respond so that the country's economic prosperity and our citizen's well-being are safeguarded.
For obvious reasons historically Ireland's main trading partner has been Great Britain (GB). We exported unprocessed agricultural produce, food and beverage goods while we imported coal, steel and consumer goods.
Post-independence the reliance of the Irish economy on the agricultural sector and remittances, and the Government's adherence to a balanced budget left Ireland economically exposed. In the 1950's this situation became critical with Ireland suffering continuously high levels of emigration and unemployment while the rest of Europe was booming. Growth was non-existent and Ireland's trade balance falling continuously. Finally, in 1958 with the publication of Economic Development (1958) the country recognised its problems and set out a plan to deal with them via opening up the Irish economy to trade and foreign direct investment. In 1973 this process culminated in Ireland joining the EEC and even more significantly signing the Single European Act in 1987. The Single European Act liberalised trade in goods and services throughout the EU. In 1993 this gave rise to the twin system for monitoring merchandise trade, namely the Intrastat system for within EU movements and the SAD (Single Administrative Document) for goods outside the EU. Interestingly, the liberalisation of trade and services from 1993 onward could be said to be the starting point of the modern Irish economy, where exports to countries other than GB began to seriously take off largely as a consequence of foreign direct investment. In light of this our study of goods export movements covers the years from 1994 to 2016. We study these export movements through the lens of the Gravity Model to gain insight into the nature of trade relationships of modern Ireland. Intriguingly and somewhat surprisingly, both the nature of Irish goods exports which were largely final products in the past, but now include many intermediate products (with concomitant transfer pricing arrangements) and the main destination for these exports in value terms which turns out not to be Western Europe but the US, are outcomes that surely would have surprised the authors of Economic Development back in 1958. 3 This paper makes four significant and novel contributions to the analysis of merchandise exports based on the Gravity Model. The first is largely methodological. In contrast to previous studies of Irish trade data, such as Lawless (2010) we apply Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), see Santos-Silva & Teyrano (2006) , to generate our model parameter estimates rather than the more conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. PPML has been shown to produce less bias parameter estimates than OLS for the Gravity Model, and as a consequence has begun to supplant OLS as the estimation method of choice. We note that in line with previous Irish and international studies our analysis of aggregate goods exports gives an estimate of the elasticity of distance close to -1 for OLS. In contrast PPML gives substantially smaller effect for distance at about -0.7 that is consistent with the more recent international studies (see Santos-Silva & Teyrano, 2006) .
Meanwhile as a robustness check of dispersion under the Poisson model assumption we also estimate a Negative Binomial Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (NBPML) model. In this case we find the elasticity of distance is about -0.9, once again a smaller effect compared to the OLS value but closer to that value. Nonetheless a key novel finding of this study based on modelling aggregate data is the distance effect is smaller than that found previously for Irish goods exports.
The second novel contribution of this paper centres on the inclusion of so-called Multilateral Resistance Terms (MRT) in our Gravity Model. For example, multilateral resistances arise as a consequence of the preference of two neighbouring countries which are remote from Ireland to trade with each other rather than Ireland.
Unfortunately the basic Gravity Model does not account for third-county remoteness and in some instances this creates a bias in the parameter estimates. Interestingly however Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) deal with this problem by deriving a set of structural gravity equations that incorporate remoteness effects via multilateral resistance terms. In this paper we take the novel approach of including multilateral resistance effects with a view to ensuring our model is as theoretically sound as is practicable from an economic standpoint.
The third novel feature of this work is our primary data source is the Central Statistics Office's (CSO) unit level CN (Combined Nomenclature) goods export data covering the years 1994 to 2016. The CN code is an identifier describing the type of merchandise being traded and we use goods exports value data at the 8-digit CN level as our basic data in this analysis. To our knowledge detailed Irish exports data at this level of disaggregation has not been analysed elsewhere in the context of a Gravity Model study. To facilitate some comparisons with other studies we mention that we also conduct an initial analysis using aggregate goods exports values obtained as year by country totals of CN 8-digit export values.
Interestingly recently the CSO produced a report entitled Bexit: Ireland and the UK in numbers (CSO 2016a) which provides a comprehensive picture of all aspects of Ireland and UK interactions including trade flows. Ireland (ESRI 2016) . Their analysis suggests the impact on trade flows could be 20% or higher in specific economic sectors with concomitant lower output in the Irish economy.
Likewise in this context the Dept. of Finance (DoF, 2017) has conducted a comparison of the trade exposure of EU Member States to the UK in both goods and services. Interestingly their analysis looked at both overall and sectoral effects of Brexit using measures of size of trade exposures of EU countries to the UK. The results highlight that relative to other Member States Ireland is substantially more exposed in a number of goods sectors and this is particularly marked in the Agri-food sector. Accordingly this brings us to the final and most important novel contribution of this paper. Here we use our variant of the Gravity Model to study the effects Brexit at the overall and main NACE (first-digit) sector levels. Importantly our model is economically sensible as it is aligned with the Structural Gravity Model methodology which is derived from solid economic foundations (see Armington 1969 and Anderson 1979) . So starting with a baseline model we compute Gravity Model parameter estimates across nine main economic sectors. Here our principle finding is a 1% increase in trade costs as measured by distance will result in a fall of 0.73% in goods exports value overall. With baseline parameter estimate computed we then further gauge the effect of Brexit on Irish goods exports under three counterfactual scenarios that describe Soft, Hard and Long Term Substitution forms of a Brexit respectively. At the overall state level our key findings are a Soft-Brexit, which broadly assumes the UK remains within the EU Customs Union, has no effect on goods trade, an outcome that is entirely expected. Under a Hard Brexit where the UK leaves the Customs Union goods exports will be impacted with a 1.4% drop on average with indigenous sectors of the economy taking the largest hit in value terms at 9 to 12%. Meanwhile based on a Long Term Hard Brexit goods export substitution scenario, trade costs would inevitably increase and goods exports value decrease by over €9bn on average and national income will fall by over 5% annually. Of course the brunt of this fall will be borne by the traditional sectors where goods exports to the UK will halve in the agriculture sector and be virtually annihilated in other traditional sectors such as food, beverage, textiles and wood products.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In section 2 we review the Gravity Model, discuss its appealing features, its flaws and what has been done to ameliorate them. We also briefly review previous Irish Gravity Model research. Section 3 looks at data trends in aggregate exports since the early nineties and their specific gravity features. Section 4 models the trade data using the Gravity Model and estimates this model using PPML. Section 5 discusses the impact of MRTs and builds a model that goes a long way to take account of these for Irish goods exports; this model is also estimated using PPML. Section 6 conducts the counterfactual analysis mentioned above while Section 7 concludes. 5
THE STRUCTURAL GRAVITY MODEL AND ITS ESTIMATION

Gravity Model features
The Gravity Model approach to analysing the value trade flows is based on the principle that trade between two countries is a function of trade costs. Trade costs are generally unobservable so proxies are used instead.
Specifically, the gravity model for (international) trade has a great intuitive appeal as it relates trade between country pairs to their economic masses, usually taken as each country's GDP, and inversely to the distance between each country pair. Expressed in this way the Gravity Model within economics is simply an empirical tool for explaining trade flows between a country pair. The tool has a long history going back at least to Tinbergen (1962) . The tool is also used to explain other types of international flows, most notably migration going back to Ravenstein (1885) .
Based on this description the cross-sectional version of the Traditional Gravity Model for the value of trade flows from country i to country j, denoted by , is given by (1)
where may be interpreted as world output and 1 , 2 and 3 are unknown constants to be estimated, , are respective country GDPs, is the distance between the country pair and is a random disturbance forcing term. Broadly speaking distance is taken as a proxy for all factors that create trade resistance or trade costs (e.g. transport costs). Now, on the basis that the disturbance is independent and its expectation ( ) = 1 we can take logs in (1) to get the more usual version which we call the Classical Gravity Model log ( ) = 0 + 1 log( ) + 2 log( ) + 3 log( ) +
with 0 = log ( ), = log( ) and ( ) = 0. In general estimating a Classical Gravity Model involves OLS estimation of the unknown parameters in (2) based on trade flow data for both exports and imports, generally aggregated at the country and year level. Given this is a log-linear model for trade flows, the coefficients 1 , 2 and 3 can be interpreted as the elasticities of trade with country GDP and distance respectively.
While Classical Gravity Model has been the basis for many studies (see Shepard, 2013 , Ch 1) it has certain basic drawbacks, two of which we highlight. First, consider the impact on trade between country pair (i, j) of a change in trade costs between country pair (i, k). Clearly this is likely to impact the trade of country j but unfortunately the Classical Gravity Model cannot account for this purely economic flaw as it does not include a trilateral trade 6 component. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) 
Previous Gravity Model Research for Ireland
Lawless (2010) Consistent with the theory, she found all of the variables capturing language, internal geography, and import cost barriers have significant effects on the number of firms, but almost none of these variables have a significant relationship with the average export sales per firm. One other study worth mentioning is Walsh (2006), he examined whether the Intuitive Gravity Model could be applied services exports and found it fitted the data well in this case also. Common Legal System before Independence -Indicator NI and GB within the EU, their EU membership indicator is set equal to 1 and the NI and GB indicators are also set equal to 1. Later to assess the effect of Brexit we re-set the EU member indicator to 0 for both NI and GB.
DATA SOURCES, IRISH EXPORTS TRENDS AND GRAVITY FEATURES
Meanwhile other CEPII variables are also dropped; these include GDP per capita, common ethnicity, common colony, date of independence and favoured trading status. Each of these variables is correlated to some degree with already included variables, GDP, country, population, distance, country or GATT membership, all of which are included variables. We introduce a time indicator variable to absorb time/panel effects present in our data in an effort to control for the movement in prices over time (see Shepard, 2013) . Our analysis also requires us to compute multilateral resistance indices, in Section 5 we show how these are incorporated into our variation of the gravity model and for this purpose we use data on international bilateral trade flows taken from the Correlates of War database (see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/bilateral-trade). Finally when we consider the Hard Brexit scenarios in Section 6 we have need of WTO tariffs, these have been sourced from:
http://tariffdata.wto.org/Default.aspx? culture=en-US.
To give a brief flavour of main features of Irish goods exports data on the merged file we have aggregated the goods export value by year and main destination area. Looking at the data relationships more generally, Table 2 provides an analysis of the (Pearson) correlation between the variables in our datasets. All correlations are significant at the 1% level except for those few cells with a grey background. High correlations are evident between Export Value and GDP, (negative) Distance, Area, Population, GATT/WTO and EU membership. Accordingly, these variables should be important predictors for Export Value. Among the predictor variables GDP proves strongly correlated with population and area while area is simultaneously highly correlated with population, these relationships are to be expected as. Nonetheless, the NI and GB indicator variables are of interest and correlations between these and other variables tends to be quite low. To some extent this is a mathematical artefact that arises because the computation of the denominator in the correlation is inflated when one of the variables is an indicator; a feature that in general tends to reduce the value of correlations based on indicator variables
Turning now to look at some key gravity model relationships in more detail, Figure In Figure 3 the relationship between exports and country distance is displayed. As expected and predicted by theory a negative correlation with the Linear (Distance) is evident with the trend line falling with distance.
Accordingly, working with the Intuitive Gravity Model (2) once again seems a good idea. However, it is also clear from the plot the variation of the data values about the trend line grows with distance, roughly doubling as the distance moves from about the value 1 through 15. Hetroskedasticity is therefore present and this would indicate that using Gravity Model (3) and estimating the parameters via PPML is the better option. 
INITIAL MODELLING AND RESULTS
Our starting point for modelling the data is goods exports value aggregated by year and destination country, this
gives us a panel of 4,061 non-missing observations on which to base our first set of estimates. We use OLS to generate parameter estimates for each trade volume effect variable listed in Table 1 
with goods exports from Ireland to country labelled and is the ℎ indicator variable given in Table 1 .
Correspondingly, we use PPML to generate parameter estimates from the Exports PPML Gravity Model 
while the Exports NBPML Gravity Model is also estimated via (5) but with an alternative non-canonical log inverse link function (see McCullagh and Nelder, 1989) .
The results of model estimation are given in Table 3 where in all cases the coefficient of variation
SE of the parameter estimate divided by the parameter estimate) is computed based on robust SEs and a significance level of 1% is reported with a *. For the trade effect variables listed in Table 1 
Meanwhile for the OLS model we also report the model fit (adjusted) 2 value in Table 2 and for GLM models a pseudo-2 statistic (see Heinzl,and Mittlbock, 2003) given by
is reported -.here ( ̅) is the deviance in the Null (intercept only) Model and () is the deviance of the fitted model. Importantly, we caution these deviance measures are not directly comparable to the 2 as deviance estimates are not based on minimising the sums of squares in a GLM.
The results in Table 3 are intriguing. With the exception of the population variable all three methods give parameter estimates with similar levels of precision as the corresponding ′ turn out to be similar. As a consequence of this all three methods tend to give a similar set of variables that are significant at the 1% level.
Of course there are some differences with the population variable being the most notable (see next page).
Looking at the overall measures of fit both the OLS and PPML models provide very high levels of fit but the NB model is poor in comparison suggesting estimates from this model should be ignored. We note this verdict is reinforced by the size of the log-likelihoods where smaller is better, for the PPML model this is -5.3x10
8 while the NB model (which allows for over-dispersion) gives much higher value -4.1x10 4 . In light of this we conclude there is little evidence the apparent over-dispersion in Figure 4 affects the model estimates leading us to conclude the PPML model is robust for these data. Accordingly our analysis proceeds based on the OLS and PPML models.
Looking now at GDP (recall data are in logs) the OLS parameter estimate (i.e. elasticity) is 1.16 while PPML is 1.41. As expected based on theory and in line with the very high positive correlation value given in and elsewhere more generally (see Head & Meyer, 2013, §4) . In contrast to OLS the PPML estimate is considerably smaller in absolute magnitude at -0.62 and is much closer to the correlation figure -0.43 reported in Looking at the other variables in Table 2 we see firstly that time is significant with an elasticity of -0.2 with PPML, this suggests the importance of merchandise exports over time is falling in relative terms. Interestingly, the area of the destination country has a negative effect on trade, thus Ireland tends to export less to larger countries proportionately under these models. The population parameter is also negative under PPML with a value -0.77 showing a 1% increase in population will reduce goods exports by 0.77%. At first sight this seems strange, but it is a common feature of PPML models incorporating a population variable (see Flaherty 2015) .
Essentially, since GDP per capita must be positive, accordingly population must be a divisor in the model resulting in a negative coefficient on the log scale. However, these estimated parameter values do contradict the correlations given in Table 2 where goods exports were positively correlated with both area and population while area and population pair also has a positive correlation of 0.84. So-called sign reversal or confounding is at play here -this arises when correlation estimates are contrasted with multiple regression parameter estimates when there is also correlation among predictors. This situation likewise occurs with the common religion variable which has a PPML parameter estimate of 0.17 Here the PPML model seems to give the more sensible outcome as most of Ireland's main trading partners are Christian or might be thought of as having been 'Christian'. Accordingly, a 1% increase in the Christian population of a trading partner will result in a 0.17% increase in Irish goods exports to that destination country. It is also worth pointing out that the change in sign of the parameter for religion and population under OLS as compared to PPML at first sight seems worrying, however Piermartini & Yotov (2016, p34) point out this feature often occurs where OLS and PPML estimates are compared.
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The GB indicator provides us with contradictory picture regarding the relative importance of GB as an export destination. While a negative estimate is observed reflecting the declining importance of GB as an export destination, there is a substantial difference between OLS = -1.28 and PPML = -0.32 estimates, with the latter not statistically significant at 1%. On the basis of this analysis GB exports are at a percentage level similar to the mean percent level of most other countries -to a degree this is a comforting observation with Brexit looming as it shows GB no longer dominates Irish exports. Meanwhile, controlling for all other factors and using (6) the NI indicator shows a 79% lower percent level of exports w.r.t to the global average. On this basis and from a size, proximity and declining importance (see Figure 1) perspective, NI therefore does not seem to be too vital an export market for the rest of Ireland. Accordingly the Brexit of NI shouldn't adversely impact on the rest of Ireland except possibly within specific traditional sectors -this issue will explored in more detail in the Sections 5 and 6 of this paper.
As might be expected, being a member of GATT/WTO shows a strong relationship with a trade effect of 90%
under PPML and 65% under OLS. Naturally the large positive effect of GATT/WTO will balance somewhat the large level drops observed for GB and NI. Also under PPML having English as a common language is not significant. On the basis that PPML is the more correct model specification, this shows that English as common language is far less important than might be thought. Indeed this probably just reflects the fact that many countries already use English as an international language for communication and so having it as a common language shouldn't be overly important. Looking at EU membership we again see a sign reversal between OLS and PPML. The latter indicator shows a 22% fall which seems counterintuitive. However, when considered in light of the growing importance of the USA as an export destination the finding is less surprising. Moreover, this negative relationship also agrees with the findings of Morganroth, (2008, see Table 2 Single European Act Indicator) who suggests the probable cause is a falloff in intra-EU trade and an increase in external trade due to globalisation. Meanwhile the percentage effect associated with being a member of the Euro currency is 65%
under PPML showing being in the Euro area enhances Ireland's trade overall, this value is higher but nonetheless is broadly in line with the 30% effect found by Baldwin (2006) . Mind you it must be said that Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) found virtually no effects on trade for the Euro, after taking into account the high level of trade integration of Eurozone members even before they formed a common currency. Finally, the results for 'Common Legal System before Independence' show that countries which share a British type legal system are strong export destinations with a 145% trade effect overall. Once again this will tend to balance the large GB and NI drop in percentage goods export levels.
For completeness, we also note that more a detailed analysis of parameter estimates for model equation (5) Table 1A with all starred parameter estimates significant at the 1% level. We also note that all analysis and results from here on will be based on PPML estimation of the CN8 data cross classified by main (NACE) industry sector.
MULTILARERAL RESISTANCE MODELLING AND RESULTS
As noted above a key flaw in the Traditional Gravity Model is that it fails to take account of remoteness MRT effects. Failure to take account of MRTs has been referred to as the gold medal mistake of traditional gravity model analysis by Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) . One of the solutions Feenestra (2004) 
where , is expenditure by the importing country in the relevant year on all imports and is the total world exports in that year. We compute these yearly remoteness indices using bilateral total trade data from the Correlates of War database and use these to augment the Exports PPML Gravity Model (8) 
Along with the basic variables included in (8), equation (9) has 23 export remoteness time effect indices and 190 country fixed effect dummies. Of course, as we now have a set of remoteness (MRT) indices covering all time periods, the continuous time variable included previously is no longer necessary as the remoteness indices now absorb time effects. We apply this model to our CN8 exports data and present the results by main industry sector in Table 4 . For comparison with counterfactual scenarios in the next section we refer to the parameter estimates in Table 4 as Baseline estimates. Table 4 with the corresponding PPML parameter estimates in Table 3 . Comparing GDP which is a continuous variable, so the parameter is the elasticity, the remoteness indices and country effects reduce the elasticity from 1.41 to 1.065, a drop of almost 25%. Meanwhile the effect on distance and therefore on direct trade costs is an increase in absolute magnitude from -0.62 to -0.73, nearly 18%. Furthermore, the effect on most of the other variables is also substantial with the three last variables, EU Member, Euro currency and Common Legal System going from being statistically significant to not being so under Model (10). The conclusion here is clear, neglecting remoteness results in biased estimates and here the effect is generally in excess of 20% (in absolute value) which is quite substantial. On the basis of this and studies elsewhere (see ) as well as the theoretical foundations of the Structural Gravity Model of which (10) is a unidirectional adaptation, we speculate the results in Table 4 are among the most credible based on gravity modelling of Irish goods exports values.
In Table 4 the overall the elasticity of GDP w.r.t goods exports at 1.065 shows us that a 1% increase in GDP across Ireland's goods export destination countries will return almost a 1.07% increase in goods exports value.
Within sectors goods export elasticities in the traditional sectors (1 st five columns) are all positive and substantially less than one. In Agriculture for example the estimate is 0.432 so a 1% increase in GDP across all export destinations will result in a 0.43% increase in goods export values. In general exports in the traditional sectors are likely to have low unit values so a small percentage value response to an increase in GDP is to be expected. Equally these sectors will suffer least from a general fall in our GDP which is comforting with Brexit on the horizon. The Chemicals & Pharma sector has an elasticity of 1.265 while Metals & Machinery is 1.19.
Thus a 1% increase in GDP across goods export destinations will be associated with substantial increases of 1.27% and 1.19% respectively in Irish goods exports. Once again it is likely these sectors produce high unit value goods so substantial increases in goods export value responses are to be expected in a general global expansion.
Looking at the key variable Distance which reflects direct transports cost associated with traded goods the overall elasticity is -0.73, accordingly a 1% increase associated with the distance Irish goods exports travel will mean the value of those exports will drop by 0.73% -this is quite a large distance effect. Across the sectors the distance parameter estimate is, as expected, negatively correlated with goods exports. Agriculture exports will fall by 0.94% for 1% increase in distance. Specifically, a simple example suggests agricultural produce exported from Ireland to France at 1,557km instead of Britain at 494km (distances by road taken from https://www.freemaptools.com), a distance factor of 3.15, will trigger the value of those exports to fall by a factor of 2.96 -with Brexit an impact of this size will mean goods export values fall to 34% ((1/2.96)*100%) of their current levels over time -this is of course is a substantial drop in a sector which is important to the indigenous Irish economy. Among the other sectors distance has the greatest effect in Chemicals & Pharma where the elasticity is -1.822. Interestingly without MRTs the corresponding value from Appendix Table 1A is -0.419 which gives the impression that an increase in distance doesn't overly affect export values, as might be expected given the trade in these goods is global so they already travel substantial distances. However, controlling for remoteness, (the tendency of distant countries to trade more with each other) via MRTs shows that distance and therefore trade cost have quite a severe impact on goods export values in the sector. Given the importance of multinational companies in this sector the relevance of this finding should not be ignored by those involved in promoting these industries.
The estimates in Table 4 show that importer country area has a small effect on goods export values. The same applies to population size with the exception of Mining & Quarrying where population size is negatively correlated with export values and has an elasticity of -1.239. This suggests goods exports in this sector tend to be to smaller countries that are also likely quite close. The remaining continuous variable Common Religion also has a very small effect on goods exports; indeed here most of the sectoral parameter estimates are not significant reinforcing the relative lack of importance of a shared religion in determining exports -of course this is not particularly surprising.
Turning to the indicator variables the percent effect of GB and NI respectively using (6) are -46% and -78%.
Note this is a level effect and therefore simply reflects the degree of importance of these two UK zones in terms of Ireland's export values compared to the global average level. Indeed this is also a reflection of the declining importance of the UK to Ireland's goods exports, particularly in value terms. Nonetheless across the sectors the picture is more varied. In Agriculture the parameter estimates are 2.058 and 3.758 for GB and NI respectively; these values give percent effects of 683% and 4,186% respectively. Clearly these huge positive level effects serve only to demonstrate the relative importance of the UK to Irish agricultural exports. With the exception of Textiles the UK also tends to be vital to the other traditional sectors though not to as great an extent as with agriculture. Meanwhile, at the other extreme the relative unimportance of the UK as an export destination to the Chemical & Pharma sector is shown with very large negative elasticity of -3.943 and -4.782 for GB and NI respectively.
Overall the parameter estimate for the GATT/WTO indicator is negative which is a little surprising given that most countries are members of these organisations. Across the sectors five parameter estimates are not significant. Meanwhile destination countries using English are also shown to have a positive effect on goods exports, but intriguingly within agriculture English is associated with relatively lower levels of goods exports.
As noted above parameter estimates for EU member, EU Currency and Common Legal System are not significant. However, as might be expected the parameter estimate the Agriculture is significant for EU membership and currency, the same applies for Metals & Machinery. For Chemical & Pharma though we can see that EU membership is -0.502 equating to a -39.5% level effect relative to the global level. While this might seems a little surprising the Chemical & Pharma exports to EU countries other than one destination country tend not to be overly substantial when we have controlled for GB.
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The last row of Table 4 shows the percentage of remoteness indices that were found to be significant. It is clear where this value is 100% the inclusion of MRTs is important but for agriculture and food & beverage exports it is clear MRT are not relevant. Given goods in these sectors tend to be traded with near neighbours this observation seems reasonable. Indeed comparing the result in Table 4 with those in Appendix Table 1A where no remoteness indices are used, the effect of MRTs in agriculture is quite small while in textiles the parameter estimates can be very different and therefore biased where MRTs are ignored.
To summarise the findings, it is clear that including MRTs has a substantial impact on parameter estimates.
Equation (10) is a variation of the Structural Gravity Model which has a sound economic basis unlike classical gravity models which are empirically based. Accordingly the results in Table 4 are much more credible than those in Table 3 (or indeed Table 1A) The second approach is statistical or data based. Here the analyst simulates the effects on trade of different conditions such as GB not being in the EU and compares the result with baseline estimates. In principle this approach is relatively straightforward but care needs to be taken to ensure the simulation actually mirrors reality.
In this section we will explore econometric PE effects directly by making changes to indicator variables and indirectly via the statistical approach to counterfactual analysis, with a view to gauging the effect Brexit may have on our goods exports and its impact on our economy more generally.
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In this section we consider three counterfactual scenarios that might describe different forms of Brexit as it applies to merchandise exports from Ireland; these are:
• Soft Brexit: For merchandise exports this means the UK leaves the EU but stays fully within the EU Customs Union and so does not apply any tariff to goods originating in the EU, it also applies EU tariffs to goods from third countries.
• Hard Brexit: A Hard Brexit for merchandise exports means the UK leaves the EU and leaves Customs
Union. It applies ad-valorem WTO tariffs to Irish goods and sets its own standards of compliance for goods it imports from the EU. As a consequence a hard border is created on the Island of Ireland.
• Now, within the econometric approach PE effects are the initial and generally the strongest direct response effects on our exports/imports to a change in trading conditions, these effects only are explored in this study.
First baseline estimates are established and then the counterfactual changes are made and the model parameters re-estimated. In our case the baseline estimates are given by the PPML estimates shown in Table 4 . The first counterfactual we explore is Soft Brexit. Here we simply set the EU indicator variable to zero for both GB and NI and otherwise assume all trading conditions remain the same. On this basis we proceed to re-compute the PPML counterfactual model parameter estimates; these are given in Table 5 where they are referred to as SoftBrexit estimates.
Comparing Soft Brexit estimates in Table 5 to those that apply to goods export values under the existing arrangements in Table 4 , it is clear that the both tables are almost identical. This is appealing as distance and most of the other variables have not changed and so, trade costs associated with, for example, distance can be expected remain the same. The GB and NI indicators have changed but of course this is nothing other than an indicator level shift due to the values of the combination of EU and GB indicators or EU and NI indicators respectively being altered from (1, 1) to (0, 1). Thus, for example, the combination of the GB indicator parameter estimate for All Sectors in Table 4 is -0.608 while the EU indicator parameter estimate is -0.193. In Table 5 the EU value stays at -0.193 but the GB value changes to -0.800 = -0.608-0.193 due to the EU indicator value now being set to zero while the GB indicator is kept at one. Accordingly, Table 5 simply reflects the pure   23 indicator value change associated with GB and NI being removed from the EU assuming all other trading conditions remains the same. Therefore, under this Remoteness Gravity Model a Soft Brexit has absolutely no effect on trading conditions, an outcome that is entirely expected. The second counterfactual scenario we consider extends the Soft Brexit set up but involves the imposition of WTO tariffs by the UK on Irish goods exports -a set up that is referred to as a Hard Brexit. This scenario places a hard border on the island of Ireland. We consider ad-valorem tariffs only taken from the WTO Tariff Database for year 2017. As noted in the InterTrade Ireland Report (2017) these tariffs are set on goods classified according to the 6-digit Harmonised System (HS6) and can vary from 0 to 80%. Importantly, HS6 is identical to the CN trade classification system at the six digit level. Accordingly we match our CN8 data to the WTO HS6 at 24 the 6-digit correspondence level and apply the WTO tariffs at this 6-digit level to Irish goods exported to GB.
We assume the price of the good in the UK remains the same but the imposition of the tariff reduces the value to Irish exporters by the tariff rate. This reduced value is taken as the export value for goods exported to the UK in our PPML estimation of the Remoteness Gravity Model. The resulting parameter estimates are given in Table 6 . We compare the Hard Brexit parameter estimates in Table 6 to their corresponding Soft Brexit estimates in Table 5 and not the Baseline estimates in Table 4 as the latter pair are identical except for the level shift effect mentioned above. It is clear that the both tables are once again almost identical. It is somewhat surprising that the impact of the tariffs on trade cost as measured by distance is negligible. This is especially so since, as noted above, some WTO tariffs are set at 80%. However, their impact is also negligible as in general high tariffs in excess of 50% tend to apply to a small number of products mainly in the Food & Beverage sector and so reduce 25 the overall export value by only a few million Euro. That said, the comparison of the estimates in Tables 5 and 6 shows that goods exported to the UK will not experience a trade cost effect under the imposition of a WTO advalorem tariff -subject to frictionless movement of Irish goods into the UK this would be very comforting outcome for Irish exporters. Of course in a Hard Brexit the UK remains outside the EU and here the parameter estimates of GB and NI in Tables 5 and 6 reflect this effect. For GB the All Sectors estimate drops from -0.800 to -0.850, using (6) the percentage level equivalents of these amounts are -55.1% and -57.3% respectively. Of course for indicator variables we can use a variant of (6) to compute the overall relative change in the percentage value of Irish exports according to
while for continuous variables Hard vs. Soft elasticities can be directly compared, so the relative change is simply
For statistically significant key predictors these quantities are reported in Table 7 (in grey scale). Thus for the GB indicator the relative effect of a Hard Brexit is a drop of 4.9% in goods export value. In the NI case we find the fall overall is 6.5%. If, in addition we consider a worst case two SE situation, the relative effect for GB would result in a drop 6.8% while overall for NI trade the effect would be a drop by 9.4%. We note this value is very similar to the value of 9% given in the InterTrade Ireland Report (2016) which it is important to note includes ad-valorem and other non-tariff trade levies and barriers. Interestingly, on the bottom row of Table 7 we also quantify the impact of a Hard Brexit on the overall value of Irish exports to the existing EU-28 assuming the UK has left the EU. To be precise, the overall impact is arrived at by adding the tariff adjusted value of exports to the UK to the EU-27 value under the Hard (or below Long Term Hard) scenario and then computing the percent change in this value for the resulting EU-28 relative to the EU-28 Soft Brexit value. We note this is an exact calculation that is available to us because we apply the tariff directly to the detailed CN6/HS6 export values classified by country. On foot of this the overall percent impact on the value of Irish goods exports to the EU-28 is expected to fall by just 1.4%. This is also a key novel finding of this study. with the UK in these sectors are above the global average. In Agriculture the GB parameter estimates are ̂= 3.033 in Table 5 and ̂= 2.919 in Table 6 . Using (6) the respective percent equivalents are 1,975% and 1,752%. In terms of the relative impact of a Hard Brexit on the value of Irish Agricultural exports the figure in Table 7 shows an expected fall of 10.8% compared to a Soft Brexit. Meanwhile with a Hard Brexit the corresponding effective drop in the value of cross-border agricultural export trade turns out to be 8.6% on average. More interestingly, whether it be a Soft or Hard Brexit scenario, a worst case two SE situation could see agriculture exports to GB drop in value by up to 17.6% while for NI it would be 15.1%, an effect that is considerably lower than the 66% initial estimate identified in Section 5. Similar effects will be felt by exporters of Food & Beverages products to GB with expected falls in the relative value of exports being 12.8% while for NI the average drop will be 10.8%. Moreover a worst case two SE could see the fall in the relative value of trade being 16.4% for GB and 14.4% for NI. Meanwhile at the overall EU-28 level there is about a -6% impact on export values across the traditional sectors of the Irish economy on foot of a Hard Brexit. More generally the figures show the UK effect of about a 10% drop in goods exports values translates into an overall EU-28 drop of about 5 to 6%. Looking at the non-traditional sectors in Table 6 the Chemicals & Pharma sector has negative parameter estimates indicating percent value levels are below global averages. However the GB parameter changes very little so there will be no effect here. As ad-valorem tariffs are virtually zero across this sector this result is not surprising. Meanwhile from Ireland has a revealed comparative advantage in many indigenous sectors. Our approach here is relatively straightforward, within each year and for each group of CN8 goods exported to the UK we look for a corresponding CN8 substitute within the EU. Where a substitute is available we change the destination country to the alternative EU country and adjust the value to the corresponding EU value. Where an alternative EU destination does not exist we apply the WTO tariff regime as previously described and leave the UK as the destination country. With the dataset reconfigured in this way we re-run our PPML model estimates with the results shown in Table 8 . Two key points are important to highlight here, first we have assumed perfect 28 instantaneous substitution of goods across markets and this occurs without affecting the price in the destination.
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A nice additional feature therefore of our approach is that it captures the instantaneous effect of a tariff or other trade policy. Second, we have assumed transit to the new destination will not be via the UK so no transit tariffs apply and therefore all goods export costs remain a function of distance and other predictors in the model.
We compare the Long Term Hard Brexit results in Table 8 to the Soft Brexit estimates of Table 9 this is reinterpreted as a relative impact using (10) where we see the effect is a drop of 94.9% for GB and 76.8% for NI respectively -values much more in line with the 66% drop initially identified in Section 5. As in Table 7 we can also quantify the overall EU-28 level impact on Irish goods exports of, in this case, a Long Term Hard Brexit. Here this measure is central as it bundles together the effect of the tariff on those remaining goods sent to the UK with the value of all goods diverted from the UK to the EU (now priced at the appropriate EU country value), along with those originally sent to the EU. Accordingly the real value derived from the exported goods across the existing EU-28 is measured and this is compared to the Soft Brexit value. Thus, in Table 9 Clearly, what the analysis in this paragraph tells us is that if price of Irish goods exported to the UK stays as is, then in the long term the value of goods exports to the UK will become negligible while the value of crossborder exports would run at about one-quarter of their current levels. For all practical purposes this would kill off the Irish goods export trade to the UK. Moreover, the extra cost of diverting those exports to other EU countries will reduce the overall value of Irish goods exports by close to 20% across the whole EU-28.
Accordingly, in tariff equivalent terms Irish exporters should stay in UK markets after Brexit where tariffs stay well below 20%, above this they will likely cease trading unless their export price can be reduced by at least that percentage amount.
For the agricultural sector the GB indicator parameter estimate value changes from 3.033 in Table 5 to 1.715 in Table 8 -using (6) the corresponding percent levels are 1,752% and 456%. In Table 9 we can see this translates into a relative drop in the level of exports of 73.2% on average. However a portion of this drop would be compensated by a rise in these exports to the EU where the parameter estimates change from 0.975 to 1.194 equating to a relative growth of 25% (using (10)). For NI the relative impact on the Food & Beverage sector is -87.1% which represents a virtual wipe out in the value of Food & Beverage exports to NI. A similar effect occurs for exports to GB. Meanwhile, the distance or trade cost associated with these exports is 65.9% in Table   9 , so if the new destination for existing Food & Beverage exports to the UK is to be the EU, then Irish exporters will have to absorb this substantial trade cost effect. Comparison of export values at the EU-28 level shows a severe drop of 42.2% in export values overall when UK tariffs and transport costs to the EU are taken into account. Clearly a large drop in Irish producer prices will be necessary to offset the increased costs and ensure the export price stays competitive. It seems likely this would make trading in the sector very difficult and in the long term could lead to many companies having to cease trading in Ireland.
As with other traditional sectors of the economy Table 9 also shows a very substantial relative impact on
Textiles for GB and NI with falls of 97% and 94% respectively in the value of exports. This however is compensated by the EU indicator increase of 24.3% (using (10)), reflecting percent levels change from 10.6% to 44.9%. Finding new EU markets that could absorb an additional 70% of textile imports is likely to be challenging without a minimum drop in the export price of at least 33.8% based on overall EU-28 percent impact on the export value. Meanwhile looking at the effects on the Chemicals & Pharma sector Table 9 shows relative impacts of 96.8% and 73.4% for GB and NI respectively. Nonetheless, the trade cost impact as measured by distance in this sector is negligible, a reflection of the fact that these goods have very small tariffs and high unit values so the marginal cost of diverting to the EU is likely small. Unsurprisingly with such a wide range in outcome values it would seem largely impossible for policy makers to chart a future course that deals with all eventualities. However this is not the case. In fact the span of outcome values reported here suggest that a core principle of Ireland's policy approach must centre on ensuring the UK and our EU colleagues fully understand the magnitude of economic impact of Brexit on Ireland both in lost income in traditional business but more so in the huge number of firms likely to cease trading. This will not just impact Irish incomes but will foster social dislocation and disaffection especially in those regions of Ireland most dependent on goods trade with the UK. Moreover, it is clear from this analysis that Ireland cannot simply trade (with the EU for example) its way out of the long term effects of a Hard Brexit. Without crying wolf, this fact along with social and economic and wider political impacts must be communicated with as much effort as practicable by the Irish Government and its officials.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the effects of Brexit on merchandise goods exports using the Gravity Model. The latest gravity modelling methodology has been used throughout. Firstly this includes embedding our approach with the realm of the latest economic theory via the Structural Gravity Model of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) .
The key innovation in this model is the inclusion of multilateral resistance terms (MRTs) to account for remoteness effects. We analyse goods exports only and so the Structural Gravity Model in this case recovers PE (partial equilibrium) effects but does not recover CGE (conditional general equilibrium) effects. shown to produce less bias parameter estimates than OLS for the Gravity Model and as a consequence has begun to supplant OLS as the estimation method of choice. We also have tested the robustness of PPML against dispersion using the alternative Negative Binomial PML approach and found PPML to be more reliable.
Meanwhile we initially compared OLS and PPML estimates for Irish goods exports data and found the distance parameter estimate in the Classical Gravity Model is close to -1 for OLS while it is about -0.7 for PPML.
Interestingly our PPML estimate is consistent with the finding of Santos-Silva & Teyrano (2006) -we highlight this as a key novel finding of this study.
Another novel feature of this research is our primary data source is the Central Statistics Office's (CSO) unit level CN 8-digit (Common Nomenclature) export data covering the years 1994 to 2016. We use this data, PPML estimation and a Remoteness Gravity Model structure that accounts for multilateral resistance to trade as a platform to generate a picture of the trading environment experienced by Irish goods exporters. Using this approach as a baseline our key findings show that including multilateral resistances has a substantial impact on parameter estimates. Our key novel finding here is that trade costs measured by distance has a substantial effect on goods exports, specifically a 1% increase in the distance Irish goods exports travel will mean the value of exports will drop by 0.73%. This value while large is nonetheless lower (in absolute magnitude) than the value found in previous studies such as Lawless (2010) or Fitzsimons et. al. (1999) . Moreover, this baseline analysis showed that agricultural exports shifted to France from GB could see goods export values fall by up to 44% over time.
We followed up the modelling of goods exports by considering three possible Brexit scenarios in the context of the Remoteness Gravity Model; these scenarios are Soft-Brexit, Hard Brexit and a Long Term Substitution Brexit respectively. Interestingly our Soft Brexit analysis produced parameter estimates identical to the earlier baseline estimates showing that the UK remaining within the customs union has no effect on goods exports -as expected exporting life goes on as normal save for a nominal change in destination identity. Accordingly it makes sense that this option should remain Ireland's preferred policy option. However, if a Hard Brexit prevails 33 goods exports will be impacted with a 1.4% drop on average with indigenous sectors of the economy taking the largest hit in value terms at 9 to 12%. The overall economic impact in the worst case will be no more than a ½% reduction in national income. Going beyond this the long term Long Term Hard Brexit goods export switching scenario showed trade costs would inevitably increase and goods exports value decreasing by over €9bn on average and national income falling by over 5%, while in the worst case the impact could be up to €13bn per year. Once again the traditional sectors of the Irish economy bear the brunt of this impact. We also showed that there is a wide range of realistic outcomes from those which we have quantified as having no impact on goods export values up to those having a 95% impact in some sectors. Accordingly, to address these threats to 
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